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When the late Mr. Justice Owen Roberts came to Oxford in
November 1951 to deliver his often cited lecture on The Rule of Law
in the International Community, he referred to the idea of the rule of
law as recognized by what he called "highly civilized nations." In the
discussion which followed his lecture Roberts was asked what countries
he would cover by that phrase. He replied:
"My test would be, first, a country that has a representative
form of government; second, a country where individual liberty
and freedom are protected by law; [and third] where there are
bounds and limits to what the government can do to an individual."
It is of great importance to note that he is here referring to three
entirely distinct concepts which are frequently treated as if they were
part of a single one, with the result that our ideas may tend to become
confused. If we talk of (a) democracy, (b) the basic rights of man,
and (c) the rule of law as if they mean the same thing, and are indis-
solubly linked together, then we shall sacrifice the precision of thought
* The original version of this Article was delivered in February 6, 1958, as the
Owen J. Roberts Memorial Lecture under the auspices of the Pennsylvania Chapter
of the Order of the Coif and the University of Pennsylvania Law School. In preparing
this lecture the author has borrowed extensively from the various papers read at the
conference held at the Harvard Law School in 1955 on the occasion of the bicentennial
of John Marshall. They have been published in GOVERN NT UNDER LAw (Sutherland
ed. 1956). He has also used the papers read at the Chicago Colloquium (hereinafter
cited as Chicago Colloquium) in September 1957 on The Rule of Law as Understood
is the West. Of these papers to be published in the near future, Professor C. J.
Hamson's Preliminary Memorandum was of particular value to the author. He
also is indebted to Dean Jefferson B. Fordham and Vice-Dean Theodore H. Husted, Jr.
for their article John Marshall and the Rule of Law, 104 U. Pa. L. REv. 57-68 (1955).
t Master of University College, Oxford.
(943)
944 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 106
which is so necessary when dealing with problems that may give rise
to the strong emotions frequently engendered when there are diver-
gencies of political opinion. The confusion which may arise from our
failure to make a proper analysis of the various ideas which are under
discussion has sometimes proved of value to those who are seeking to
befog the whole issue.
In his reference to "a representative form of government" Roberts
was concerned with the nature of democracy, but this question is not
directly related to the nature of the rule of law as it is possible to have
a democracy which is uncontrolled by law. In his famous classification
of the six different types of government, Aristotle, in Book III of his
Politics, divided them into three constitutional states-monarchy,
aristocracy, and moderate democracy-and three despotic states-
tyranny, oligarchy, and extreme democracy or mob rule. The first
three are examples of government under law, while the second three
are government by uncontrolled will. By suggesting that there is a
necessary relationship between democracy and the rule of law it is
possible to conceal the fact that a majority in a democratic state may
be as tyrannical as any individual despot if there is no effective con-
stitution to control the exercise of its power. This was one of the
cardinal errors made by some of the political philosophers in the
nineteenth century, for they suggested that by the establishment of
democracies all other political problems could be solved. Bitter ex-
perience has taught us that this may not be true. It has been pointed
out that Woodrow Wilson's phrase that "the world must be made
safe for democracy" would have been nearer the truth if he had said
that democracy must be made safe for the world. We must realize
therefore that democracy and the rule of law do not mean the same
thing, and that they may even be in conflict on some occasions. It is
true, of course, that we are more likely to find the rule of law in a
democracy than in any other form of government, but it does not follow
from this that there is an inevitable relationship between them.
Mr. Justice Roberts' second reference is to individual liberty and
freedom. Here we are concerned with those rights that have been
called basic, fundamental, natural, common-law, "self-evident" and
"unalienable" to use the phrase from the Declaration of Independence.
These basic rights include such concepts as freedom of speech and of
religion, freedom from arbitrary imprisonment or arrest, and protection
against the deprivation of life, liberty, or property 1 without due process
of law. These are included in the first eight and the fourteenth amend-
1. The phrase "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness" in The Declaration of
Independence shows how vague the concept of basic rights can be.
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ments of the Constitution of the United States. Other statements con-
cerning these basic rights can be found in many other modern constitu-
tions such as those of Eire and India, but they are not included in the
Australian or Canadian Constitutions. Recently the Council of Europe
has adopted a "Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms" which is now in force. A "Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights" has been issued by the United Nations, but it
is reasonably clear that this will not be given legal force in the foresee-
able future. Although in the past it was the practice to limit these
basic rights to personal freedom and to private property, the list has
widened today to include such concepts as the right to work, to
education, and to a minimum standard of living 3 It is possible to
debate such questions indefinitely, for no two countries have ever been
in agreement concerning the nature of these basic rights, and how
they can be guaranteed. It is therefore of the utmost importance to
keep entirely separate the idea of basic rights and the idea of govern-
ment under law because the former is bound to be vague and uncertain
while the latter is clear and definite. If we fail to distinguish between
the two, the uncertainty of the former will infect the latter. This
does not mean that the ideals which are expressed in the concept of
basic rights are not of great value, but it can only lead to error if we
identify them with the rule of law. The truth is that these basic rights
only receive practical recognition when they are adequately protected
by the rule of law. In other words the rule of law is the machinery by
which effect can be given to such basic rights as are recognized in any
particular legal system. If we concentrate our whole attention on the
nature of those basic rights which ought to be recognized, then we may
overlook the entirely separate question: In what way can effect be given
to such rights when they have received recognition?
It is this machinery which is covered by Mr. Justice Roberts'
reference to a highly civilized country "where there are bounds and
limits to what the government can do to an individual." These bounds
and limits are marked by the control which is exercised over the public
officers of the State by means of law. It is this which constitutes the
rule of law,4 or to use a more accurate phrase, government under law.
2. 1-2 P AsLv, CONSTITUTIONS or Ni iONS 89, 189, 239, 315 (1956).
3. In a paper presented at the Chicago Colloquium, Mr. Ernest Angell said: "The
original, primary concern of the Rule with protection of fundamental rights against
encroachment by the state has broadened to include rights or privileges based on
affirmative action by the state to provide equal opportunity in public services such as
education, public housing, etc.; and to protect against encroachments by other indi-
viduals or groups."
4. It is unfortunate that so many different meanings have been attributed to the
phrase "rule of law." The classic statement of the rule of law from the English
standpoint is that by A. V. Dicey: "We mean, in the first place, that no man is
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It is here that we find the principle which guarantees all our rights and
liberties, for if these officers are not bound to recognize them then
they can be disregarded at any moment. A constitution may contain
a most elaborate bill of rights, but if its terms can be disregarded at
will by the public officers then these provisions will be of little effect. I
believe that the greatest contribution that the common law has made
to the development of modern civilization is to be found in its emphasis
on this machinery, while leaving to others the formulation of the general
rights of man.
We must be careful, however, not to claim too much for this rule
of law if we are to understand the function which it performs in a
political society. The phrase "the laws of the Medes and Persians" is
a warning that law may become too strict; this is true in particular when
the rules that control the public officers are over-rigid, because, as a
result, the government may lack the necessary flexibility. On the other
hand, if they are too fluid, then they will not constitute a sufficient re-
straint. The problem here is a question of due proportion, as is true in
the case of almost all other political antinomies. But of this we may
be certain, unless there is adequate recognition of the rule of law there
can be no limitation on the power of those who control the government
of the State, and, therefore, no protection against despotism. Thus,
we can say that although the rule of law is not by itself a guarantor of
freedom, nevertheless its existence is a prerequisite if such freedom is
to be established.
Confusion has been caused by the similarity between the phrases
"a rule of law" and "the rule of law." A rule of law in the ordinary
sense means any rule of conduct which is binding either on (a) the
ordinary citizen, or (b) on the public officers of the State. It is
obvious that even under the most absolute tyranny there must be laws
punishable or can be lawfully made to suffer in body or goods except for a distinct
breach of law established in the ordinary legal manner before the ordinary courts of
the land.... We mean in the second place... not only that with us no man is above
the law, but (what is a different thing) that here every man, whatever be his rank or
condition, is subject to the ordinary law of the realm and amenable to the jurisdiction
of the ordinary tribunals." Diczy, LAW O1V 'IM CoNsTITu~ioN 188, 193 (9th ed. 1952).
Sir W. Ivor Jennings said: "The doctrine involves some considerable limitation
on the powers of every political authority, except possibly (for this is open to dispute)
those of a representative legislature. Indeed it contains ... something more, though it
is not capable of precise definition. It is an attitude, an expression of liberal and
democratic principles, in themselves vague when it is sought to analyse them, but
clear enough in their results." JENNINGs, THE LAW AND THE CoNsTITUTIoN 47 (4th
ed. 1952).
The International Commission of Jurists in its RULE OF LAW PRoJEcT defined the
rule of law as: "The institutions and procedures, not always identical, but broadly
similar, which experience and tradition in different countries of the world, often having
themselves varying political structures and economic backgrounds, have shown to be
essential to protect the individual from arbitary government and to enable him to
enjoy the dignity of man."
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in sense (a) binding the ordinary citizen, as it would be impossible for
those in control of the State to govern in any other way. An autocrat,
having absolute powers of life and death over his people, would never-
theless have to issue general laws if the administration of his govern-
ment were not to disintegrate. A rule of law in sense (a) therefore
exists in all States. This is not true, however, of laws in sense (b)
which bind the public officers themselves, because such legal control of
officials is not an inevitable part of government. In other words, the
officers who govern by law need not also govern under the law.
Unfortunately the distinction between "rule by law" and "rule
under the law" has been blurred by the imprecision of the language
we use. It is the dual sense of the phrase "rule of law" which has
enabled the apologists for the totalitarian systems to argue that they
represent the rule of law more truly than do the Western States.5 In
a Western State, they say, the individual is given undue freedom of
action uncontrolled by the law, even though this liberty may be exer-
cised to the detriment of the community; on the other hand, in the
totalitarian State this individual freedom of action is strictly controlled
by rules of law which have as their purpose the defense of the public
interest. It follows, according to this view, that the rule of law is
more fully recognized in the totalitarian countries than it is in those
which place greater emphasis on the freedom of the individual. This
extraordinary paradox illustrates the hopeless confusion into which we
can be led unless we understand the exact sense in which the phrase
"rule of law" is being used, especially when some of the disputants are
deliberately taking advantage of the ambiguity. I shall therefore use
the phrase "rule of law" solely in the sense of a rule which controls the
public officers of the State. I am not speaking about rule by law which
can be the most efficient instrument in the enforcement of tyrannical
rule: I am speaking about rule under the law which is the essential
foundation of liberty. The two are totally distinct.
This is no novel idea, for it was fully recognized more than two
thousand years ago by the Greeks, perhaps the most highly civilized
people in all history. In his recent book, The Greek Experience, Sir
Maurice Bowra has said: "In Greece, whatever type of government
might exist, the law was still regarded as the foundation of society." 6
5. See the paper by Professor G. Treves at the Chicago Colloquium on The Rule
of Law in Italy in which he pointed out that "in its heyday [of the Fascist State]
the sycophants wanted to disguise totalitarianism under a respected cloak, such as
that provided by the legal state. . . . Some went as far as to affirm that the Fascist
state was more entitled to be called legal than the Liberal state, as more relations
were regulated by the law than ever before, and that the corporate state was a refine-
ment of the legal state."
6. BowRA, THE GREmK E XaERxC 66 (1957).
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This rule of law protected the people "on the one side from the claims
of irresponsible monarchs," and on the other "from the claims of the
unprivileged populace." In his work on Historical Jurisprudence, Sir
Paul Vinogradoff, in speaking of the rule of law, said: "The exercise by
the magistrates of their powers as determined by law wag carefully
watched. . . In Greece, the principle was rather to put the magis-
trates in such a position that they should always be subject to the supe-
rior authority of the community." 8 In Book IV of his Politics, Aris-
totle emphasized that the law is the body of rules to be followed by the
magistrates in performing the duties of their offices.' It was this
control of the magistrates which distinguished a constitutional state
from a tyranny.
This Greek conception of rule under the law found less expression
in the writings of the Roman political philosophers as it obviously was
in conflict with the absolute power exercised by the Emperors. It does
not follow from this, however, that the idea of rule under the law did
not play an important part in Roman polity, for the great corpus of the
Roman law would not have attained its supreme position if those who
administered it had been free to disregard its provisions whenever they
thought that this was desirable. The respect shown to this law was so
great that it continued a life of its own after the destruction of the
Empire.
After the long chaos of the Dark Ages which followed the
collapse of the Empire there emerged the medieval States, and with them
there came a revival of the concept of rule under the law. This was
strongly supported by the Church, which claimed that within its own
sphere it was not subject to control by the Sovereign. The idea that
the Sovereign was above the law had not as yet been suggested, for,
as has been said, "the principal foundation upon which medieval political
theory was built was the principle of the supremacy of law." "I The
Magna Carta, which is recognized as the foundation-stone of Anglo-
American liberties, would be meaningless without this principle be-
cause it assumed that the King must be made subject to the law which
he had violated in the past."
7. Id. at 73.
8. 2 VINOGRADOFI, OU IiNxS OF HIS~rORICAL JURISPRUDNcm 113 (1922).
9. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS (2d ed., Jowett transl. 1938).
10. 5 CARLYLE, MxDImVAL POLITICAL TEORY IN VH WeST 457 (1928).
11. See 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, HISTORY OV ENGLISH LAw 181, 182 (1911):
"That the king is below the law is a doctrine which even a royal justice may fearlessly
proclaim. The theory that in every state there must be some man or definite body of
men above the law, some 'sovereign' without duties and without rights, would have been
rejected. Had it been accepted in the thirteenth century, the English kingship must have
become an absolute monarchy, for nowhere else than in the person of the king could
the requisite 'sovereignty' have been found."
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It is not necessary to trace here the development in comparatively
modern times of the idea that the Sovereign cannot be controlled by
the law. The doctrine that in every State there must be an all-
powerful government is a nineteenth century one: it was only then, as
Professor Plucknett has said, that "Leviathan had indeed come to
life."' We are reaping some of the results of that doctrine today.
Fortunately it has never been accepted in the United States as it is
completely incompatible with the principles on which the American
Constitution is based. The most important of those principles-
government under law-we owe in large part to the works of John
Locke and of William Penn.
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This brief reference to the history of the rule of law doctrine may
be of some use in showing how important was the role which it
played in the past, but it will not help us to understand how it works
in practice today. To realize its present significance it is necessary
to analyze the effect of the rule in detail, with special reference to the
various branches of the government to which it may be applicable. It
is obvious that under no conceivable political system can there be
complete rule under the law, as a large degree of freedom of action
must be left to those who exercise the power of government. On the
other hand, there is hardly any political system, however tyrannical,
which can function without placing some legal limitations on the
powers of its officers. We cannot therefore draw an absolute line of
division between those states which recognize the rule of law doctrine
and those which do not, but it does not follow from this that we cannot
distinguish the degree to which this doctrine is recognized and enforced
in each State.
Similarly, although it is not possible to draw an absolute line
between the exercise of the various functions of government, there is
no reason to reject for practical purposes the long-established division
between legislative, executive and judicial powers. This distinction is
of special importance when we consider the effect of the rule of law
doctrine because it may be more fully applicable to one branch of
government than it is to another. Thus, in the United States the
emphasis is placed primarily on the control of the federal and state
legislatures by the rule of law as expressed in the Constitution, while in
Great Britain and France the interest is centered almost entirely on the
control of the executive.'3
12. PLUCHNETT, HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 62 (4th ed. 1948).
13. The papers read at the Chicago Colloquium strikingly illustrate this point.
See in particular LeTourner and Drago, Principles of the Rule of Law as Seen by the
French Conseil d'Etat.
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Control of the Legislative Power
The relation between legislative power and the rule of law doctrine
gives rise to a most interesting and contentious problem, because in a
federal state, such as the United States, it is assumed without argument
that the legislature can always be limited by law as expressed in the
Constitution, while in a unitary state, such as Great Britain, it is
difficult for the jurists to appreciate that such a limitation is possible.14
Thus Dicey, in his classic Law of the Constitution,"5 speaks of Parlia-
ment as "an absolutely sovereign legislature" which therefore "cannot
be bound by any law." From this standpoint there is no distinction in
theory between the absolutism of Parliament and that of the most
despotic monarchs.' The danger in this view is that it has enabled
the jurists of the totalitarian countries to argue that the orders issued
by an absolute dictator and the statutes enacted by Parliament are in-
herently of the same nature. Thus, when on the "night of the long
knives" on June 30, 1934, Hitler ordered his Blackshirts to murder
his opponents, this was justified by the Nazi legal philosophers as a
legal expression of sovereign power . 7  At the recent trial of ex-General
Sepp Dietrich for the execution of six men held in prison at that time,
Dr. Koch, who had been the prison governor, was asked if anyone had
suggested that the shootings were illegal. He said: "No, no one
raised that point." 18 It is a point which would certainly have occurred
to every prison governor in a country under the rule of law.
Dicey's failure to distinguish between a statute of Parliament and
the order of a despot is based on his conclusion that both Parliament
and the despot can be described as absolutely sovereign. But is this
true? A despot can only be described as an absolute sovereign if his
will, however it may be expressed, must be obeyed. He is not an
absolute sovereign if his will must be expressed in a particular manner,
e.g., if it must be issued under the Great Seal, or if it must have the
14. On this point Sir Owen Dixon, Chief Justice of Australia, in his paper on
Marshall and the Anstralian Constitution, GovlRNMnNT UNDim LAw 306 (Sutherland
ed. 1956) said: "For elsewhere in that world [the English-speaking world], except to
students of political science, federalism seems to have been beyond comprehension;
and indeed even today there is reason to think that understanding of it is denied to
those who pass their lives under a unitary system of government."
15. DIceY, LAw ol TH4 CoNsTiTuTIOx 39, 40 (9th ed. 1952).
16. Id. at 80.
17. In his address on July 15, 1934, to the German people, Hitler said: "In this
hour I was responsible for the fate of the German nation, and in these twenty-four
hours I was therefore the supreme court of the German nation in my own person."
In an editorial in the London Times on July 16, 1934, it was said that this "shows how
completely the present rulers of Germany have thrown aside all the principles of
law and justice which distinguished a modern Western state from an Oriental
despotism. ... "
18. Manchester Guardian, May 7, 1957, p. 7, col. 2.
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concurrence of others. It is true that Louis XIV said that "l'Ttat c'est
moi," but this was a misinterpretation of the constitutional position, as
is shown by his conflicts with the Parlements."9 His successors real-
ized how great this error was. In the case of Hitler there was such
absolute sovereignty, for no restraint of any nature was placed on the
expression of his will. On the other hand, there is no such absolute
sovereignty in the case of Parliament, because there are fixed rules
that must be followed before the expression of its will can be obeyed.
It is axiomatic that if the Monarch, the House of Lords, and the House
of Commons were to meet as a single body and unanimously agree on
a particular statute, their action would not have any validity as it would
be contrary to the British Constitution. Similarly, the House of Com-
mons can only act by a majority of the elected members; therefore,
if a minority were forcibly to exclude from the Parliament Chamber the
duly elected majority, it is clear that the courts would not recognize this
action as valid.20 It can therefore be said that no person or body of
persons can be described as absolutely sovereign if they are bound by
rules of procedure. It is true, of course, that in the case of Parliament it
would be possible for the three elements which constitute the Queen-in-
Parliament to alter the constitution by setting up a dictator, but they
would have to follow the present constitutional procedure if their act
were to have validity. Dicey therefore failed to give a true picture of
the British Constitution, because he failed to draw a distinction between
those rules of law which may govern the constitution and procedure of
a legislative body on the one hand, and those which may control its
substantive powers on the other. By procedural rules I mean those
rules which establish how those who hold the legislative power are
determined and what steps they must follow in exercising this power,
while the substantive rules are concerned with the subject matter which
can be dealt with by the legislative body.
In the American Constitution we find a striking illustration of
both types of these rules of law. It divides the legislative power be-
19. On this point Professor Tunc has said: "The kings had excessive powers, yet
the negative powers of the Parlements prevented them from introducing desirable re-
forms and answering popular desires.. . . The Revolution at certain stages, and
Napoleon, established governments more absolute than had ever been experienced."
GovxRNM4Nr UNiDR LAw 420-21 (Sutherland ed. 1956).
20. It is true that the two prints of an.act which are signed by the clerk of the
Parliaments become the official copies of the act and that printed copies of them are
accepted as evidence in the courts, but this does not mean that the courts will be
precluded in all circumstances from a consideration of the validity of the certification.
In MAY, PA.LAmENTARY PRACticE 600 (16th ed. 1957), it is said that: "Although a
departure from the usage of Parliament, during the progress of a bill, will not vitiate
a statute, informalities in the final agreement of both Houses have been treated as if
they would affect its validity."
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tween the President, the Senate and the House of Representatives, and
it is axiomatic that no court would recognize as valid a statute which
had not been enacted by the two branches of the legislature, or which
had been vetoed by the President. These are procedural rules of law.
But the Constitution also contains rules strictly limiting the subject-
matter which falls within the jurisdiction of the federal government; any
statute enacted by Congress which does not fall within this jurisdiction,
or which conflicts with the bill of rights amendments will be held by
the courts to be null and void. The American rule of law governing
legislative power is therefore twofold in character in that it establishes
on the one hand how this legislative body is chosen and how it can act,
and, on the other hand, it limits the subject matter with which the
legislature can deal.
When we turn to the constitution of Great Britain we find a
system under which there are binding procedural rules, but where the
existence of rules of law limiting the subject matter with which
Parliament can deal is doubtful. It has sometimes been said that there
is no constitutional law in the true sense in Great Britain because the
provisions of the constitution can be altered at any time by the Queen-
in-Parliament, 2 but it is equally true that the American Constitution
can be altered at any time if the proper procedure is followed. The fact
that it is far easier to alter the British Constitution than it is to amend
the American one does not affect this point. Nor is it relevant that the
dominant power of government is in the hands of the House of Com-
mons, because the House of Lords must still play its proper part in
the legislative process. Until a change has been made in a constitutional
manner the established rules must be obeyed; it is here that one of the
essential distinctions between despotism and government under law
is found.
21. In his interesting book TH4 LAW AND TH4 CONSTITuTION (4th ed. 1952), Sir
W. Ivor Jennings has said: "The only fundamental law is that Parliament is supreme.
The rest of the law comes from legislation or from those parts of judge-made law
which have not been abolished by legislation. Strictly speaking, therefore, there is no
constitutional law at all in Great Britain; there is only the arbitrary power of Parlia-
ment." Id. at 64. With great respect, this statement is of doubtful validity. To say
that Parliament is supreme is insufficient unless we know what is meant by Parlia-
ment. To explain what Parliament is we must state the fundamental rules which
govern not only its three constituent elements of Monarch, House of Lords and
House of Commons, but also their relationship to each other. It is true that these
elements and their relationship can be altered by any existing Parliament, but until
that is done the present rules constitute part of the fundamental law, i.e., the consti-
tutional law of Great Britain. This point is of great importance because there is a
vital constitutional difference between a British statute which will only be valid if it
has been enacted by a majority vote of those present in the House of Commons, a
majority vote of those present in the House of Lords, together with the consent of
the Monarch (even though this has now become automatic) and, on the other hand,
the command of a despot such as Hitler or Stalin. To describe both the statute and
the command as the expression of "arbitrary power" suggests that there must be
an error in the original premise.
THE RULE OF LAW
Whether there can be said to be any rules of law limiting the
substantive powers of the British Parliament is a more doubtful ques-
tion. The answer depends on our definition of law. Dicey defined
state law as "any rule which will be enforced by the courts," and he
therefore reached the conclusion that all rules, however obligatory
their nature might be, which were not subject to the ordinary judicial
process must be regarded as non-law.l He therefore held that inter-
national law was a branch of public ethics and was "miscalled inter-
national law." ' Similarly, any rules concerning the administration of
government which were not subject to legal enforcement in the ordinary
courts were "miscalled constitutional law" as they were a part of
"political ethics." " Dicey's definition was accepted in the United
States by Professor John Chipman Gray." This Anglo-American
interpretation places the main emphasis on recognition by the courts
because they have always played such a dominant role in the systems
of government in those countries. In recent years this definition has,
however, been under increasing criticism on the ground that it gives a
misleading picture, due to the failure to recognize the modern develop-
ment of the administrative process." Thus Lord Hewart's reference '7
to the administrative tribunals as a form of "new despotism" was based
on the view that these tribunals, not being ordinary courts of law,
could not be said to be administering law, even though they followed
established rules in reaching their decisions. This ignores the fact
that recognition by such a tribunal that a rule is obligatory will be just
as effective as a similar recognition on the part of a judge. It is true,
of course, that, in general, more discretion is given to an administrative
tribunal than to an ordinary court of law, but it does not follow from
this that the tribunal can disregard the law that binds it.
A second objection to the Dicey definition is that it is only ap-
plicable, if at all, to Anglo-American law. The Continental jurists
have never attributed such importance to the judicial process alone.
28
They point out that judicial recognition of the law would be completely
22. DicEY, op. cit. mtpra note 15, at 40.
23. Id. at 22.
24. Ibid.
25. GRAY, NATUR AND SouRmcs or Trm LAW (2d ed. 1921).
26. See in particular Wade's introduction to Dicay, LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION
(9th ed. 1952); JrMNINGs, Tiaz LAW AND TH1 CoNSTITuTION (4th ed. 1952).
27. HEwART, TE Nwv DEsPorxsm (1929).
28. See paper by Professor Nils Herlitz at the Chicago Colloquium on The
Critical Points of the Rfde of Law as Understood in the Northern Countries, in
which he referred to the meaning attached to the word "law" in the Northern
countries: "When we use it, our thoughts do not go immediately to the courts; the
rule of law does not necessarily imply the Justizstaat, though, of course, the courts
are a very essential element in our system."
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ineffective unless similar recognition were accorded by the executive
whose function it is to enforce the law. Nor do they regard a con-
stitutional provision which limits the powers of the legislature as non-
legal merely because there is no power in the courts to disregard a
statute which may be in conflict with such a provision. Professor Tunc
has pointed out that in fact the French legislature regards itself as
bound by such constitutional provisions, and that there has been no
instance in which they have been disregarded.29 Under the Continental
interpretation of law any rule is to be regarded as a part of state law if
it is recognized as being obligatory by any one of the three branches
of government. I believe that this wider interpretation is more satis-
factory than the limited Anglo-American one which places over-
emphasis on the judicial process. It is generally accepted today that
recognition by the administrative officers that a rule is obligatory
entitles the rule to be classified as legal in nature; it is suggested that
the same principle of classification should be followed when a legislative
body recognizes that it is bound by certain fundamental principles.
The American Constitution provides in express terms that the
courts shall be independent, and that there shall be no arbitrary im-
prisonment or interference with freedom of speech or of religion. These
express principles of the American Constitution have been derived
from the principles which have long been recognized as an essential part
of the unwritten British Constitution. To deny that they are obligatory
under the British Constitution, while recognizing their legal nature
under the American one, is to place all the emphasis on form and none
on substance. It is to disregard the character of English constitutional
history with its great landmarks " that have established those funda-
mental rights which no Parliament can reject except in time of war. I
believe that it is true to say that the legislative powers of Parliament
are limited by certain fundamental principles which are universally
accepted even though there is no other body in the constitution which
can prevent Parliament from exceeding these limitations. It is in
defense of such principles that men have been prepared to die in the
past and will be prepared to die in the future.
When we turn to the totalitarian systems of government we find
that the legislative power is vested in an individual who is uncontrolled
29. "The French authors consider that there is a much greater need for control
of executive or administrative action than for control of legislative action. . . . I must
say that I have tried to find some examples in which judicial review of legislative action
would have been useful in France. I failed to see even one case where it was reason-
ably clear that the legislature had disregarded the constitution and where it would
have been important for the courts to declare the statute inoperative." GOV MIrMNt
UNPn~ LAW 43, 74 (Sutherland ed. 1956).
30. Magna Carta, The Bill of Rights, The Petition of Right, The Habeas Corpus
Act, The Act of Settlement.
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by procedural rules of law. Under such a system there must, of course,
be one basic rule which is recognized as vesting this absolute uncon-
trolled legislative power in the individual, but after that the law is
silent. An illustration of this can be found in the Nazi system, under
which the uncontrolled will of Hitler was sufficient to determine matters
even of life and death. The same was true, as we know, in the case
of Stalin. The exercise of such arbitrary will, whether expressed in the
form of a general order or in a particular command, is despotism.
This has been admirably stated by Professor Mcllwain in his Con-
stitutionalism: Ancient and Modern:
"[I]n all its successive phases, constitutionalism has one essen-
tial quality: it is a legal limitation on government; it is the
antithesis of arbitrary rule; its opposite is despotic government,
the government of will instead of law." 31
It is essential that this distinction between despotic rule uncontrolled
by procedural or substantive limitations, and legislative rule controlled
by law should be clearly realized, for here again there has been an
attempt made by totalitarian apologists to argue that there is no essential
difference between government under law and government under
arbitrary will.
Control of the Executive Power
When we turn from the control of legislative power by the rule
of law to the control of executive power we are on less controversial
ground because all jurists-certainly in the Western countries-
agree that this is an essential part of government under law.
Before discussing the machinery which can make this effective, a
preliminary point of the greatest importance must be emphasized.
There can be no such effective control if the executive officers are also
vested with full legislative power, for in such circumstances every
executive act can immediately be given legal validity, either before or
after it has been done. The principle of separation of powers is of the
utmost importance here, and it was for this reason that the authors of
the United States Constitution were so insistent that the exercise of
legislative and executive powers should be in separate hands. But, it
may be asked, how can this principle be reconciled with the parliamen-
tary system that exists in Great Britain and almost all other Western
countries, as under it the heads of the chief departments of state, such
as the Treasury, the Foreign Office, etc., must also be members of the
legislature? In Great Britain these officers constitute the Cabinet,
31. MdILwAix, CoxsTiTuTioxAIsm: AN cNT AND MoDi N 21-22 (rev. ed. 1947).
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which, for all practical purposes, controls while it is in office all legis-
lation enacted by Parliament. I have emphasized the words "while it
is in office" because it is in them that we find the guarantee of the rule
of law. Every cabinet officer is responsible to Parliament not only for
his own acts, but also for those of his subordinates, and if he fails to
satisfy Parliament that he has acted in a proper manner then the
government can be defeated by an adverse vote. It has therefore been
said with truth that the hour of Question Time, which is the first
business of most parliamentary days, is the most effective machinery
that has ever been devised for the control of the executive by the
legislature. The exact opposite situation can be found in a totalitarian
country, because under that system the executive has full legislative
powers. The German jurists who served under Hitler were therefore
justified in holding that no act which had been authorized by him could
be regarded as illegal. Where they were misleading was in their argu-
ment that such a system could be in accord with the doctrine of the rule
of law.
Executive government under law therefore means that an ad-
ministrative officer functions under rules which contain specific pro-
visions controlling his actions, or under rules which give him a legally
controlled discretion. It is necessary to distinguish between the two
because no modern system of government could function if the ad-
ministration had to be conducted in all circumstances according to fixed
rules. There must frequently be a degree of flexibility supplied by
administrative discretion, but this discretion is not arbitrary in nature;
it must be exercised in good faith and within the limits set by the
legislature. "Discretionary power does not carry with it the right to
its arbitrary exercise." '
When we consider in greater detail control by rule of law of the
executive function, we find that the major problem today concerns the
division between administration according to strict rules, and adminis-
tration under controlled discretion. Until a century ago the emphasis
was in great part on administration under fixed rules because the
functions of the State were regarded primarily as negative. Thus it
may be said that the maintenance of internal order by the police, and
of external order by the army and navy, and the collection of taxes
are of a negative character. These functions can in large part be
controlled by strict and precise rules as the degree of discretion that is
required is of a limited character.
Of equal importance is the consideration that strict control of
those who maintain order, and of those who are concerned with the
32. Shachtman v Dulles, 225 F.2d 938, 941 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
THE RULE OF LAW
revenue is essential if political liberty is to be maintained. It has been
said that the two foundation stones on which the Anglo-American
system of government is based are protection of individual freedom,
and the control of taxation. In both instances the maximum protection
is given by the rigid control exercised over the public officers. Per-
sonal liberty, as everyone knows, is guaranteed by the Writ of Habeas
Corpus because in every case imprisonment must be strictly justified
under the law. Lord Denning in his book Freedom Under the Law '
has described this as the most famous writ in England. As he has
pointed out, "whenever any man in England is detained against his will,
not by sentence of the King's Courts, but by anyone else, then he or any-
one on his behalf is entitled to apply to any of the judges of the High
Court to determine whether his detention is lawful or not." " The
police must, within twenty-four hours, bring any person they have
arrested before a magistrate, who must then decide whether the prisoner
shall be further detained pending trial, or let out on bail. It has been
said that each sentence of this writ is of more value than a library of
books written in praise of freedom. Every step taken by a public officer
in arresting or imprisoning a man is rigidly controlled by precise and
strict rules. When we turn to the control of taxation we find a similar
strictness of procedure. As Professor Mcllwain has pointed out,
political liberty was established in England through control of the
purse by Parliament. 5 It is a basic principle of the British Constitution
that no impost should ever be collected that has not been specifically
authorized by Parliament, and this is enforced by the strict rule that
any attempt by the officers of the State to raise money in other ways
such as requisitions is illegal. This was the principle established by the
courage of John Hampden in his resistance to the imposition of ship
money in 1637. Edmund Burke's famous words in his Speech on
American Taxation given in 1774 have often been quoted: "Would
twenty shillings have ruined Mr. Hampden's fortune? No! But the
payment of half twenty shillings, on the principle it was demanded,
would have made him a slave." It would be a gross violation of a
basic constitutional principle if Parliament were to give any Minister
discretion in a matter relating to taxation.
Until the nineteenth century the rules governing executive inter-
ference with private property were almost as strict as those relating to
taxation or to interference with personal liberty, but with the develop-
ment of the activities of the modern State, and especially of the welfare
33. DENNING, FREEDOM UNDER THE LAW (1949).
34. Id. at 6.
35. MCILVAIN, THE HIGH COURT OF PARLIAMENT AND ITS SUPREMACY (1910).
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State, it has been found impossible to control executive action in such
an absolute way. In place of strict provisions there has been a sub-
stitution of executive discretion in an ever increasing number of fields,
but it is essential to remember that this is never regarded as an
arbitrary discretion to be used in a tyrannical manner.
The control of this discretionary power by the rule of law is a
problem which has not as yet been adequately solved either in Great
Britain or in the United States."6 In the case of strict rules which
bind the public officers there is obviously no difficulty in providing that
any dispute concerning their interpretation and application should be
decided by the ordinary courts of law. But when the proper exercise of
the executive's discretion is the point at issue then the regular legal
procedure is hardly suitable as it would be difficult for the judges to
decide questions which tend to be of a technical nature. There has
therefore been strong support for the suggestion that administrative
courts on the French model should be established,8 7 but this has been
opposed in England on two grounds. The first objection is that if
appeals to the ordinary courts were provided in all cases in which
discretionary executive acts were in dispute, the courts would become
clogged, and the administrative machine would not be able to function
efficiently. The second objection is that such legal control would run
counter to the English doctrine of ministerial responsibility under which
the Minister must be prepared to answer to Parliament for any action
taken by one of his subordinates, as it would lead to hopeless confusion
if the Minister took one view and the judge took another. It is
impossible to foretell what solution to this problem will eventually be
found, but it must be acknowledged that until a more efficient method
of controlling executive discretion has been devised there will be some
ground for the view that in this regard the rule of law occasionally
proceeds in a halting manner.
In the United States similar problems relating to the exercise of
executive discretion have arisen, but I do not wish, even if I were
competent to do so, to add to the vast literature on this subject. 8
When we consider the control of the executive by rule of law
under the totalitarian systems we find a different picture. It would, of
course, be incorrect to suggest that no such control exists, because it
36. The most recent attempt to solve some of the problems has been made by
the committee under the chairmanship of Sir Oliver Franks in its Report on Adminis-
strative Tribunals and Enquiries, Comnd. No. 218 (1957). See Wade, Administration
Under the Law, 73 L.Q. REV. 470 (1957).
37. See HAmsox, THE CoNsEi D'ETAT (1954) ; RoBsoN, JUSTICE AND ADMINI-
slRA IVm LAw (1928).
38. See Stason, Administrative Discretion--A Critical Contemporary Problem,
Chicago Colloquium.
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would be impossible to administer a great modem State if the public
officers were not required in general to follow established rules. There
is, however, a fundamental distinction in the nature of these rules
and the degree to which they are enforced. This is true in particular
in the matter of personal liberty. Perhaps no other fact marks in so
dramatic a way the difference between the meaning attached to the
phrase "rule of law" in totalitarian and in Western countries as does the
position of the executive in relation to imprisonment. If the executive
can send men and women to a concentration camp without due process
of law then it is futile to speak of government under law, for all other
rights must disappear under such circumstances. It is significant that
the French Revolution began with an attack on the Bastille where a
few prisoners were held under lettres de cachet. for this was the visible
symbol of arbitrary government.
Control of the Judicial Power
So far I have been speaking of the rule of law which may control
those who exercise the legislative and the executive powers of the
State. Is it possible to speak in similar terms of a rule of law that
controls those who exercise the judicial power? At first sight it would
seem to be incorrect to suggest that the judges can be controlled by
the law as it is they themselves who administer the law; but this, I
believe, is to misunderstand the nature of law. It is because the judges
recognize that they are bound by certain rules that we can distinguish
between justice administered by discretion and justice administered
under the law. A People's Court which decides each case as it sees fit
may be administering justice, but it is certainly not administering law.
This distinction is of the utmost importance, because if the judges
are free to reach any conclusion which they regard as desirable then
they become the arbitrary rulers of the nation. In such circumstances
we have what has been described as Cadi justice and not law. The con-
fusion between the two has been of help to those who have established
despotic government. An illustration of this can be found in the
unfortunate history of the "Free "Law" doctrine which flourished in
Germany at the beginning of the twentieth century.3 9 It was in-
correctly interpreted in the sense that judges were not bound by estab-
lished rules, but were free to reach any conclusion which they regarded
as in accord with the public interest. When the Nazi regime came into
power this doctrine was used to give respectability to the claim that the
courts were entitled to disregard the long-established law. Judicial
39. See preface to KAN)RROWIcZ, Tun DrxiNiTioN or LAW (1958).
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absolutism was established in the name of "the public interest." In
the United States the short-lived Realist School seemed to accept the
view that the judges could not be bound by strict rules as it was
always possible for these rules to be interpreted in any sense which the
judges desired to attribute to them, but fortunately this view is no
longer accepted.
The rules of law that control judicial power are of various kinds.
The first and most obvious type consists of those statutes that have
been validly enacted, for there is no court which would deny that it is
bound to follow them. The fact that under the American Constitution
a statute which is in conflict with "due process" is held to be invalid
cannot be regarded as a contradiction of this principle. The second
type consists of the rules established by precedent cases. This rule of
law is more rigid in the British courts than it is in the American ones
as is shown by Mr. Justice Roberts' dissent in Smith v. Allwright4
He felt that the lack of consistency in the opinions of the Supreme Court
was weakening the authority of the law. On the other hand, the
absolute doctrine of precedent in Great Britain, established compara-
tively recently, has been subject to some criticism on the ground that
it is over-rigid, and that it denies to the legal system that degree of
flexibility which is desirable if the law is to accord with modern needs.41
When considering precedent law it is important to remember that it
may constitute a protection against tyranny, for it will enable the judge
to resist pressure on the part of the executive. Thus Lord Chief Justice
Coke appealed to the authority of the common law when he opposed the
Stuart autocracy. It is true, therefore, to say that the judge is bound
by the law so that he may be free. The independence of the judge
from outside control or influence means independence to obey the law.
The third type of law consists of those general principles which the
judge accepts as a guide when deciding a case of first impression,
for his decision must never be an arbitrary one. If there is no
statutory or precedent rule of law directly applicable to the -facts of
the case the judge must create such a rule for himself so that his decision
can be founded on law and not on will.
The rules which control the judicial power relate both to sub-
stantive and to procedural law. The substantive law is, of course, in-
finite in nature, while the procedural law is far more limited. It is
therefore only to the procedural law that I can refer to here. A failure
to reach a proper standard in procedural law is usually described as a
failure to do natural justice. The attempt to state a universal minimum
40. 321 U.S. 649, 666 (1944).
41. See GOODARrT, PRECZDrNT IN ENGLISH AND CONTINENTAL LAW (1934).
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standard has, however, been handicapped by the inevitable tendency,
shown by the jurists of each country, to assume that the rules of
procedure to which they are accustomed must be regarded as an
essential part of natural justice. Thus, it is difficult for a common-law
lawyer to believe that a proper trial can be held without oral evidence
which is subject to cross-examination, while many lawyers on the
Continent have grave doubts concerning the value of this procedure.
There is, however, one principle on which all Western jurists are
agrhed, i.e., that the judge must be fair and unprejudiced, and must
recognize that his primary and inescapable duty is to obey the law.
It was for this reason that the famous Act of Settlement in 1701 pro-
vided that the tenure of all superior judges should be during good
behavior. If, on the other hand, a judge accepts the view that he
must disregard the provisions of the law whenever these conflict with
the views of public policy as expressed by the executive, then there is an
obvious denial of the rule of law.
THE RULE OF LAW IN ACTION
In conclusion I must say a few words concerning the rule of law
in action, for here Dean Pound's famous dichotomy between law in
the books and law in action is peculiarly apposite. A constitution may
embody a lengthy statement containing the most noble sentiments
concerning the protection which is to be given to its citizens against
tyranny on the part of the officers of the State, but unless life is given
to these principles they will be nothing but a dangerous sham. In some
modern instances it cannot even be said that these constitutional pro-
visions are an expression of good intention; they have been adopted
as a form of window-dressing to hide the fact that the shop behind
them is empty.
To bring the rule of law to life three things are necessary. The
first is that in general there must be adequate procedure by which the
rule can be enforced. This is true especially in those cases where the
rule of law controls executive action. It will not help a man who has
been unlawfully imprisoned to know that the constitution contains a
proviiion that no one must be deprived of liberty without due process
of law; what he requires is some machinery which will guarantee that
his unlawful imprisonment will be brought to an end.
The second essential is that the public officers of the State should
recognize that they are bound by the law, because if they fail to do so
then the whole system may break down. We all remember President
Andrew Jackson's comment on the Supreme Court decision in Wor-
cester v. Georgia: "John Marshall has made his decision: now let him
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enforce it." 42 This is a particularly striking illustration because the
repudiation was made by the Chief Executive of the State, but the
same principle is at issue whenever a public officer, however unimportant
he may be, repudiates the obligations which he has accepted when
assuming his office. It is not unreasonable therefore for us to judge the
quality of the rule of law in any State by asking whether the police
themselves obey the rule of law.
The third essential, and by far the most important, is that the
community as a whole should recognize that the existence of the rule
of law depends on the will of each man and woman. Perhaps we can
find a simple illustration of this in the jury-box. It is here that the
question will be decided whether a police officer who has illegally
assaulted a prisoner shall be held responsible for his act. If the jury,
speaking -for the community, is prepared to excuse such unlawful be-
havior on the ground that the act was committed for the laudable
purpose of obtaining a confession, then the rule of law is brought into
jeopardy. It has been said with truth that the doctrine that the end
justifies the means is the negation of government under law; it is also
a denial of the basic principle on which the American Constitution was
based by the Founding Fathers.
Perhaps the Greeks recognized even more clearly than we do
today this universal duty which lies on all of us to see that the rule of
law is properly enforced. Vinogradoff has emphasized that "the
most usual means of keeping the magistrates in order was pro-
vided by the right of every citizen to attack and arraign a magistrate
who had actually broken the law," 8 even though he himself was not
directly affected. This was "one of the fundamental principles of the
Athenian Constitution [and] . . . it is apparent throughout the
whole Greek system that its importance was enormous." "' The
Greeks realized the fundamental truth that it is not enough to protest
when our own interests are adversely affected, for we are equally con-
cerned whenever a breach of the rule of law affects our fellow men. In
the last analysis, the rule of law, which is one and indivisible, depends
on the determination of each individual citizen that it must be obeyed
not only to protect himself but also to protect his neighbors. You may
remember John Donne's famous words: "Any man's death diminishes
me, because I am involved in Mankind; And therefore never send to
know for whom the bell tolls; It tolls for thee." " It is perhaps fitting
42. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
43. 2 VINoGRAnovF, HIs~oRicAL JuRISpRTrmNCz 114 (1922).
44. Id. at 115.
45. He was a reader in divinity to the Benchers of Lincoln's Inn from 1616 to
1622. Fourteen of the sermons he preached at Lincoln's Inn are extant.
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that in this city, Philadelphia, where the strokes of the Liberty Bell
were the first to welcome freedom, we should remember that any man's
loss of liberty diminishes all of us, because we are involved in man-
kind. At a time when tyranny and arbitrary government are threaten-
ing to spread throughout the world, this is a lesson which we must not
forget.
